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This paper concerns the new economy (alias the knowledge-based economy). I examine the 
different meanings attached to the new economy term and the evidence surrounding it, 
concentrating on the upsurge in US productivity growth between 1995 and 2000. I argue that the 
reports of the death of the new economy have been greatly exaggerated. There is evidence that 
information technology has transformed the US economy and is thus likely to have a strong impact 
on the UK economy in coming years. I discuss how elements of public policy should adapt to these 
economic changes, both in terms of an overall framework and in applications to specific areas 
(technology policy, human capital policy, competition policy and industrial policy). The new 
economy is a place of hope and fear. The hope is that policy activism can cement in potential 
productivity gains; the fear is that government actions will not mitigate the seemingly ineluctable 
pressures towards social exclusion. 
JEL classification: O3, H1, J3. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The New Economy is Dead. Long Live the New Economy! 
The new economy has gone from hero to zero in truly ‘Internet time’. Less than a 
year ago, it was trumpeted in breathless tones not only by WIRED but also by the 
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Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank
1 and even members of our own 
Monetary Policy Committee.
2 In mid-2001, newspapers are full of the ‘end of the 
new economy’ in the face of a stalled US economy, a devastated dot.com sector 
and plummeting profits of global high-tech titans. 
Some commentators have responded to these events by declaring the death of 
the new economy. Others have claimed that the speed of the downturn actually 
reflects the very nature of the new economy, where the business-cycle peaks are 
much higher than before and the economic valleys are far deeper.
3 
Both claims are premature. In this paper, I probe hard into whether there 
really is something ‘new’ in the economy. I will argue that there have been 
distinct glimmers in the USA but not (as of yet) in any other large economy.
4 
Nevertheless, if we believe in some of the old rules of how technology is 
transferred across national boundaries, then the immense productivity gains in 
the USA since 1995 promise future wealth in the UK and Europe. But this 
process of convergence is not automatic. I will argue that there needs to be some 
policy activism to reap the maximum benefits and to minimise the costs. These 
costs could be spiralling inequality and insecurity. Major technical changes 
provoke resistance from constituencies wider than just the followers of Captain 
Ludd. I describe how a sequence of linked policies can speed up productivity 
growth and expand the ‘circle of winners’ — incentives for research and 
development (R&D), expansion of basic human capital, an aggressive 
competition policy and a sector-specific industrial policy. 
Economists and other social scientists have been fascinated with the 
consequences of technology.
5 This paper continues this traditional obsession, 
with a modern twist.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses what we mean by the 
‘new economy’, Section III examines the empirical evidence, focusing on the 
recent productivity growth experience, and Section IV looks at inequality. 
Section V sets out a general policy framework and Section VI examines some 
policies on R&D, human capital, product market competition and specific 
sectors (‘industrial policy’). Some concluding comments are offered in Section 
VII. 
                                                                                                                                    
1‘This past decade has been extraordinary for the American economy and monetary policy. The synergies of 
key technologies markedly elevated prospective returns on high-tech investments, led to a surge in business 
capital spending and significantly increased the underlying growth rate of productivity’ (Alan Greenspan’s 
report to the US Congress, 13 February 2001). Full text available on www.ft.com/greenspantext. 
2For example, Wadhwani (2000). 
3John Chambers, Chief Executive Officer of Cisco Systems.  
4A case could be made for some smaller countries (for example, Ireland and Finland), but I think there are 
special circumstances for these nations. 
5For example: David Ricardo’s (1911) chapter ‘On machinery’ in The Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation; Adam Smith (1776) on the pin factory in The Wealth of Nations; Karl Marx (1859) on the primacy 
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II. WHAT DO PEOPLE MEAN BY THE ‘NEW ECONOMY’? 
Although the terms mean different things to different people (and I will use the 
terms new economy and knowledge economy interchangeably), all agree that the 
new economy is characterised by the importance of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). These include computer hardware, software 
and peripherals, as well as communications and related equipment. The Internet 
is the latest platform built upon these ICTs. On the supply side, the fundamental 
driver of the growth of ICTs is the semiconductor chip, and the enormous falls in 
the quality-adjusted prices of these chips have lain behind the phenomenal 
escalation in the importance of the computer over the last three decades (see 
Section III). The killer fact here is that the US price index for semiconductors 
has fallen from 10,000 in 1974 to 0.1 in 1999. 
Many writers have a far broader notion of the new economy in mind than 
simply these technologies. Some of these writers have argued that the economic 
principles that have guided policy-making, investment choices and empirical 
work in the past are largely redundant. A new age of global competition and 
rapid technological change has altered the ground rules. The Wall Street Journal, 
for example, offers the following: ‘When it comes to technology even the most 
bearish analysts agree the microchip and the internet are changing almost 
everything in the economy’ (Ip, 2000). 
Table 1 offers some key features of the new economy. Many of these features 
are based on the importance of information. Information is a commodity very 
different from the standard goods and services analysed by economics textbooks. 
 
TABLE 1 
Key Features of the New Economy 
Feature Definition 
Digital revolution  Prevalence of information and communication technologies, 
especially computers 
  
Human capital  Rapid growth of education and training 
  
Innovation  R&D, know-how, brands and other forms of intangible capital 
more important than fixed capital 
  
Mobility/globalisation  Capital (financial, fixed and highly skilled) very mobile across 
national borders 
  
Entrepreneurial capacity  Start-ups and new entrants key drivers of growth 
  
Clusters  Geographical concentration of high-tech firms (e.g. Silicon Valley) 
  
Inequality  Increasing wage dispersion and volatility of income, ‘winner takes 
all’ in labour and product markets 
  
Public/private  A blurring of the divisions between the public and private sectors Fiscal Studies 
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Although frequently costly to produce, information is hard to keep secret. It can 
be transmitted at low cost without reducing the pleasure of consumption to the 
person who first has the knowledge. The contrast between standard goods and 
knowledge is similar to that between cakes and recipes. A cake is costly to 
produce and rivalrous — if I eat it, you cannot. Recipes, on the other hand, can 
be reproduced very easily and consumed by many people at the same time. The 
old economy specialised in manufacturing cakes whereas the new economy 
specialises in creating recipes. This could be seen as the movement away from 
the economics of Adam Smith towards the economics of Delia Smith! 
(Leadbetter, 2000.) 
This poses an old dilemma. Since the research necessary to produce recipes is 
costly, how does the inventor appropriate the benefits from this work when the 
information spills over so easily to others?
6 Intellectual property (patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, etc.) was invented to increase the ability of inventors to 
appropriate the benefits of their intellectual labour by granting them a temporary 
monopoly. The importance of such knowledge monopolies gives the new 
economy a ‘winner-takes-all’ character. Yet monopoly power creates other 
problems and poses problems for competition policy (I return to this in Section 
VI). 
Two further things are worth noting about Table 1. First, many of these 
features are not fundamentally driven by new technology. The increased mobility 
of capital was made possible as much by political agreements over the 
liberalisation of financial and other markets as by anything else. Second, many 
of the features, such as the effect of innovation in gaining competitive advantage, 
have been around a long time. Schumpeter and the Austrian economists have 
based a whole paradigm in economics on the importance of innovation.
7 
Although the issues are not new, the quantitative expansion of sectors of the 
economy where knowledge is vital comes close to making the economy appear 
qualitatively different. The statistical weight of the ‘weightless’ part of the 
economy has become significant. For example, in 1934, R&D was less than one 
half of 1 per cent of net output; today, it stands at over 5 per cent. Other 
indicators are the huge growth in the proportion of people with higher education 
or training and the escalation of advertising budgets.
8 
                                                                                                                                    
6As Flaubert lamented in his Dictionnaire des idées reçue, ‘Innovation — Always dangerous. Inventors — 
They all die in the hospice. Somebody else profits by their discoveries; it is not fair’. 
7Although it is true that Schumpeter has had a long-standing subterranean influence upon the economics 
profession, his full impact did not come until the development of endogenous growth theory. Part of this was 
due to Schumpeter’s rather informal style. Lionel Robbins is reported to have characterised his major work, 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, as a ‘supremely intelligent after-dinner talk’. 
8One may have expected the importance of brand names to decline and the importance of technical quality and 
price to increase. Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997) show that brand is as important as technical 
competence even in the personal computer industry. I show in Section III(3) that the evidence on the 
importance of the Internet in stimulating price competition is mixed. The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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Whichever position one takes on the new economy (broad or narrow), if there 
is something new, we should be able to track it in our data. The strongest 
argument against the view that there is anything very new in the world’s 
economy has always come from the productivity numbers. In the two decades 
following the oil price shock of 1973, there was a massive increase in computing 
power. Yet, in the USA — the world’s leading economy — productivity growth 
was actually slower than it had been in the previous 60 years. Output per hour 
grew by about 1.9 per cent per annum between 1913 and 1972 but by only 1 per 
cent per annum between 1972 and 1995 (Gordon, 2000).  
What is going on? How, in the oft-quoted words of Robert Solow (1987), 
could we ‘see computers everywhere except for the productivity statistics’? Over 
the last six years in the USA, many have claimed there is at last evidence of a 
step change in productivity. We now turn to this crucial evidence.  
III. THE BEST EVIDENCE FOR THE NEW ECONOMY: 
THE RECORD ON PRODUCTIVITY 
Productivity is the key quantum of economic health. Over the long run, wages 
will reflect productivity growth, and consumption — the principal monetary 
measure of welfare — is mostly financed by wages (past, present or future). 
Although there has been a lot of attention on low inflation, low unemployment 
and high stock market values as indicators of the new economy, these are largely 
sideshows. Faster technical change should be reflected in a growth in increased 
output per hour. To economists, inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon. 
Unemployment is largely independent of technical change in the longer run.
9 
Looking over the last 200 years, despite a steady march of technology, 
unemployment is largely untrended (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). The 
vigorous debate over whether the huge stock market values of the late twentieth 
century signalled the new economy or were driven by the froth of expectational 
bubbles has diminished as these same markets have tumbled. Yet even in the 
heady days of the first quarter of 2000, it was clear to most observers that there 
was massive overvaluation, even on the most optimistic assumptions.
10 Now that 
most dot.coms are dot.gones, it is clear that there was massive overvaluation. 
One direct measure of technological change is patenting activity. There is a 
hint in the US patent statistics of an upsurge in the 1990s. Between 1900 and 
                                                                                                                                    
9In the short run, there can be an impact, of course (see Lynch and Nickell (2001), for example). Even in the 
long run, the statement needs some qualification. It may be that the Internet can reduce the level of structural 
unemployment, or NAIRU, by improving the job search and matching process in the labour market. There were 
5,000 job sites and Web-based recruitment agencies in the USA by the end of 2000. Improved information 
technology in public employment service may help. The CV of every unemployed person in Germany is 
available on the Web for employers to examine.  
10For evidence on overvaluation, see Shiller (2000) and Bond and Cummins (2000). For a perspective on 
rational valuation under conditions of great uncertainty, see Hall (1999). Fiscal Studies 
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1985, the average number of patent applications by US inventors was between 
40,000 and 80,000 a year. In 1995, by contrast, 120,000 patents were applied for 
by US inventors.
11 Although there could be other explanations for this surge, 
Kortum and Lerner (1998) persuasively argue that accelerating technical change 
is the most likely candidate.
12 
There are essentially two ways to measure productivity. The first is labour 
productivity, which is simply real output (or value added) divided by labour 
services (hours worked). The second is multifactor (or total factor) productivity 
(MFP). This is output relative to all inputs (labour and non-labour). MFP is the 
usual way to measure disembodied technological change, as it is the residual left 
over when all other factors have been accounted for (Solow, 1957). But, of 
course, MFP represents (uncompensated) improved efficiency from all sources 
as well as a hefty dose of measurement error.
13 To put it crudely, 
  Labour productivity growth  =  Technical change  +  Capital deepening 
  (Growth in output per hour worked)  =  (MFP growth)  +  (Growth of capital per hour) 
Fundamentally, we care about labour productivity, as this will have a direct 
effect on wages. Labour productivity can rise because of either a greater degree 
of inputs per person (for example, more computer power per man-hour) or an 
exogenous increase in technical change (MFP increases). From the perspectives 
of international technology transfer, however, it is MFP that is more important. 
A growth of MFP in the country at the edge of the technological frontier (for 
example, the USA) signals a potential for technology to spill over to other 
countries further away from the leading edge (for example, the UK). I discuss the 
implications of this in Section V. 
1. A Productivity Miracle in the USA? 
In the USA, labour productivity accelerated in the late 1990s relative to the 
previous 20 years, from just under 1.5 per cent a year to just over 2.5 per cent. 
One percentage point is a substantial increase — worth about $92 billion a year 
to the US economy. There have been several recent attempts to examine the  
 
                                                                                                                                    
11Kortum and Lerner, 1998. 
12The other major explanation is that the US courts became more ‘patent friendly’ following the establishment 
of the Courts of Appeals of the Federal Circuit by Congress in 1982. But this would imply that the USA should 
have become a more favoured destination for patents from firms in all countries, not just the USA-based firms. 
In fact, there appears to have been no major switch towards seeking protection in the USA by foreign firms 
post-1982. The increase in patenting appears to be part of a worldwide increase, along with an improvement in 
the relative performance of US inventors. 
13See Griliches (1996) for a historical account. He was always amused that economists specialising in 
technology placed maximum importance on an object that econometricians had always tried to minimise away 
— the residual. The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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TABLE 2 
Contributions to US Output Growth: Annual Rates of Change 
(non-farm non-government business sector) 
Percentage points 
Category 1974–90  1995–99  Acceleration 
  (1)  (2)  (2) – (1) 
1.  Growth of output  3.13  4.76  1.63 
2. Capital  services
a 1.62  2.34  0.72 
of which:     
 3.  ICT
b 0.37  1.01  0.64 
 4.  Other  capital  1.25  1.33  0.08 
5. Labour  services  1.17  1.44  0.27 
of which:     
 6.  Hours  0.97  1.19  0.22 
 7.  Labour  quality  0.20  0.25  0.05 
8.  Multifactor productivity (MFP)  0.33  0.99  0.66 
9.  Average labour productivity (ALP)  1.44  2.56  1.12 
aIncludes services of consumer durables. 
bIncludes services of consumer computers and software but not consumer communications equipment. 
Source: Derived from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000, Table 2). 
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Source: Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000. 
 
contribution of ICT (‘computer capital deepening’) and MFP (‘pure 
technological change’) to US economic growth using the standard growth 
accounting framework. This decomposes overall economic growth into its 
constituent parts — inputs and MFP.
14 Table 2 (and Figure 1) are good examples 
                                                                                                                                    
14For example, y = m + bh + (1–b)k, where y is the rate of growth of output, m is the growth rate of multifactor 
productivity, h is the growth rate of hours, b is the elasticity of output with respect to hours (proxied by the 
share of labour in total output) and k is the growth rate of the capital stock. We have assumed constant returns Fiscal Studies 
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of this approach. Taken from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), the last column of the 
table illustrates the acceleration in productivity growth in the late 1990s relative 
to the post-1974 trend.
15 
What accounted for the acceleration in overall economic growth (row 1 of 
Table 2) at the end of the 1990s? Of the 1.63 percentage point acceleration, 0.27 
of a percentage point was simply due to a greater quantity and quality of labour 
(row 5). Labour inputs have increased mainly due to welfare-to-work reforms,
16 
immigration and the long economic boom. The remaining growth is accounted 
for by capital deepening in the use of ICTs (0.64 of a percentage point — row 3) 
and MFP (0.66 of a percentage point — row 8). Although the growth of the non-
computer capital stock makes a large contribution to overall economic growth 
(row 4), it made about as large a contribution in the 1974–90 period as in 1995–
99. ICT investment, although smaller in absolute terms, is responsible for a much 
larger part of the acceleration in growth at the end of the 1990s. 
Other authors using the growth accounting framework find qualitatively 
similar results.
17 For example, Oliner and Sichel (2000) and the Council of 
Economic Advisors (2000) both attribute the vast bulk of the acceleration in 
growth to MFP and ICT investment. Bailey and Lawrence (2001) also find that 
industries that were ‘intense’ information technology users had the greatest 
acceleration in post-1995 productivity growth. 
It is not difficult to explain why there has been such rapid investment in ICT. 
The quality-adjusted price of computers fell 17.1 per cent a year over the period 
1959–95, but by 32.1 per cent per year between 1995 and 1998 (see Figure 2). 
As economic theory would predict, as their price fell computers have grown 
rapidly as a share of all investment, and this growth accelerated in the late 1990s. 
Underlying these changes is Moore’s Law: the number of transistors that can be 
crammed on a silicon chip has roughly doubled every 18–24 months. For 
example, the first logic chip/microprocessor released in 1971 — the Intel 4004 
— could hold 2,300 transistors, whereas the Pentium IV (released on 20 
November 2000) could hold the equivalent of 42 million transistors. Since 1994, 
this trend seems to have speeded up due to technological and competitive factors 
in the production of chips. Scientists expect this to hold good for at least the next 
10–20 years (Jorgenson, 2001).  
                                                                                                                                    
to scale. Rearranging labour productivity growth, y – h = m + (1–b)(k–h): a weighted sum of the growth of 
MFP and capital deepening. 
15It is conventional to drop 1990–95, as this contained a deep recession, so the two periods 1974–90 and 1995–
99 are more cyclically comparable. If the early 1990s were included in the baseline, the acceleration in 1995–
99 would look slightly larger. 
16For example, time-limited benefits were introduced under the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act. See Blank and Card (2000) for an extensive discussion of the likely impact of 
this reform. 
17We have presented the results up to 1990 rather than 1995 to avoid a potentially misleading comparison with 
the recession of the early 1990s. This makes very little difference. The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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Source: Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000. 
 
TABLE 3 
Decomposition of Growth in Output per Hour, 1995Q4–1999Q4, 
into Contributions of Cyclical Effects and Structural Changes in Trend Growth 
Percentage point growth at annual rate 




1. Actual  growth  2.75  1.99 
2.  Contribution of cyclical effects  0.50  0.63 
3.  Trend (1972Q2–1995Q4)  1.42  1.13 
4. Other  factors
a 0.19  0.19 
5. Structural  acceleration 
  (= row 1 – row 2 – row 3 – row 4) 
0.64 0.04 
6. Capital  deepening  0.33  0.33 
7.  MFP in computers  0.29  — 
8.  Structural growth in MFP  0.02  –0.29 
a‘Other’ includes the contribution of changes in price measurement and labour composition. 
Source: Gordon, 2000. 
 
So far so good for the new economy camp. Gordon (2000), however, delivers 
a much more sceptical interpretation of these figures. He makes two key points 
regarding the cycle and the contribution of the computer-producing sectors. First, 
he argues that some of the change in productivity growth during the late 1990s is 
caused by purely cyclical factors. It is well known that labour productivity 
growth is pro-cyclical, and the US economy at the end of the 1990s, he argues, 
was growing way above its long-term trend. Table 3 shows that the effect of 
making a cyclical adjustment to productivity is to downgrade the acceleration by 
about half a percentage point (row 2). Thus the structural acceleration in labour 
productivity is only 0.64 per cent (row 5). Second, he decomposes growth into Fiscal Studies 
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different industrial sectors. MFP growth in the computer-manufacturing sector 
was very substantial over this period. In fact, it accounts for all of the structural 
acceleration in MFP over this period. 
Gordon’s conclusions are very striking. He argues that there has been no 
structural trend increase in labour productivity outside of the durable 
manufacturing industries (last column), which only comprise 15 per cent of the 
US economy. In fact, there has actually been a deceleration in MFP in 85 per 
cent of the US economy. Thus, he concludes, for most of the economy the Solow 
paradox is alive and well. There does not appear to have been much of an effect 
of computer investment on productivity in large swathes of the economy. 
The cyclical correction that Gordon attempts is open to criticism. The USA 
experienced an unprecedented period of continuous economic growth in the 
business cycle beginning in the early 1990s. The cyclical benefits of productivity 
growth would normally be exhausted at such a late stage of the cycle (1999). It is 
generally accepted, however, that the bulk of measured MFP increases have been 
heavily concentrated in the computer-producing sectors. There could be several 
reasons why productivity growth has been disappointing outside durable 
manufacturing: 
1.  Diminishing returns. Gordon’s preferred argument is that the marginal 
benefit of bytes has gone down fast due to the rapid expansion in the usage of 
computer power. The price declines of computers have been more rapid than 
those of previous innovations. The largest returns were to be had in the 1960s 
and 1970s, with such things as the replacement of manual typewriters with 
word processors.  
2.  Learning. David (1990) argues that, like the electric dynamo, it takes a 
generation to learn effectively how to make best use of computers. For 
example, new forms of organisation (decentralisation, teamworking, de-
layering of middle managers) may be complementary to ICTs but difficult to 
implement.
18 This argument may have seemed plausible 15 years ago, but it 
appears less plausible as time goes on. One version of this ‘it is still to come’ 
argument is that business-to-business (B2B) electronic commerce will finally 
deliver the productivity goods. We examine this below in Section III(3). 
3.  Measurement. Real output is very hard to measure outside manufacturing 
industries (Griliches, 1994). Some of the largest computer-using sectors (for 
example, finance, retail and insurance) have unbelievably low or even 
negative productivity growth according to the official figures. Alternative 
methodologies of accounting for productivity growth do not find such a 
concentration in the ICT-producing sector (for example, Nordaus (2001)). A 
                                                                                                                                    
18This is because of genuine uncertainty about whether the organisational changes will work, the need to 
introduce many of the changes as a large package of reforms and the resistance from incumbents who will be 
displaced by these new methods. See Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) and Caroli and Van Reenen 
(2001) for microeconometric evidence in the USA, France and the UK. The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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second line of attack is that the whole aggregate growth accounting method is 
flawed due to serious aggregation biases. Econometric work at the firm level 
tends to uncover much larger effects from the use of information technology 
on company productivity (see the survey in Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), for 
example). 
Gordon’s work certainly forces us to put caveats around the US ‘productivity 
miracle’. Recent news seems to bear out his scepticism. Productivity growth in 
the first quarter of 2001 rose by only 0.1 of a percentage point. Semiconductor 
prices fell by only 16 per cent between April 2000 and March 2001, compared 
with 25 per cent per annum in the previous five years. But we should not be 
misled by one quarter’s or even one year’s figures. The latest data report that, in 
the three months up to June 2001, US output per hour rose by an annualised 2.5 
per cent.
19 The rigorous research reported in this section uses data up to the end 
of 1999. On the whole, 2000 was another strong year for US productivity 
growth. In preliminary work, Sichel (2001) uses data through to the fourth 
quarter of 2000 and finds a larger acceleration in labour productivity growth 
(1.24 percentage point acceleration between 1996 and 2000 compared with 1.04 
percentage points between 1996 and1999 as reported in Oliner and Sichel 
(2000)). Despite the expectation of a fall in information technology (IT) 
investments after 1999 when there had been big IT investments in preparation 
for Y2K problems, ICT investment rates actually rose. Clearly, the next few 
years will be the real test for whether the increase in productivity is structural or 
cyclical. Only the foolish believed that the new economy had vanquished the 
business cycle. Taking the period since 1995 as a whole, I conclude that there 
does seem to be some tangible evidence of an increase in productivity in the 
world’s largest economy. But what of the rest of the world? 
2. Evidence on Productivity in the UK and Europe: No Miracle Here 
European and Japanese productivity growth since 1950 has generally been faster 
than US growth (see Table 4). This is primarily because non-US countries 
emerged from the Second World War with lower levels of productivity and 
therefore more room to ‘catch up’. This convergence has occurred pretty evenly 
since 1950. There was a worldwide slowdown in productivity growth after the 
oil shocks of the early 1970s. This slowdown was less dramatic in the UK than 
elsewhere, primarily because of improvements in productivity in the 1980s. 
These improvements were likely to be due to increases in competition (in 
product and labour markets) under Mrs Thatcher’s reforms. In retrospect, the 
reductions in union power, privatisation, deregulation and the withdrawal of 
                                                                                                                                    
19Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.stats.bls.gov/lprhome.htm. Fiscal Studies 
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subsidies for ‘lame duck’ industries look like one-off gains in efficiency rather 
than increases in the rate of innovation.
20 
It is well known that the level of UK labour productivity is lower than that of 
our major competitors. It is a major policy priority of Chancellor Gordon Brown 
to close this productivity gap.
21 Table 5 shows the figures. Much of the gap 
between the UK and France/Germany can be accounted for by lower investment 
in fixed capital. This lower investment is mainly due to lower public spending on 
infrastructure and lower investment in the housing stock (see Bond and 
Jenkinson (1996)). The rest of the gap is accounted for by lower spending on 
skills. Nevertheless, even after accounting for these inputs, a substantial gap (13 
per cent) remained between the UK and the USA in terms of MFP. 
The picture of recent productivity growth outside the USA is disappointing. 
There has not been an acceleration in productivity growth in the late 1990s in 
any of the main economies outside of the USA. The UK position is illustrated in  
 
TABLE 4 
Longer Productivity Growth Rates in the UK and Other Countries 
  GDP per hour worked  Total factor productivity 
  1950–73 1973–99 1950–73 1973–99 
UK  2.99 2.13 1.30 1.17 
France  4.62 2.56 3.13 1.55 
Germany    5.18 2.29 3.98 1.64 
USA  2.34 1.08 1.66 0.43 
Japan  6.11 2.78 3.39 1.18 
Source: Crafts and O’Mahony, this issue. 
TABLE 5 
Levels of Productivity, 1999 
UK = 100 
  UK France  Germany  USA Japan 
GDP per capita  100  105  104  148  112 
GDP per hour  100  124  111  126  91 
MFP, whole economy  100  109  100  113  77 
Source: Crafts and O’Mahony, this issue. 
                                                                                                                                    
20For a discussion of the impact of the Thatcher administration on productivity, see the contributions to 
Blundell, Card and Freeman (2001). Unions are an interesting example. Their influence has dramatically waned 
— 53 per cent of workers were in unions in 1980 compared with under 30 per cent today. It is likely that 
unions reduced the level of productivity in the UK in the 1970s (Pencavel, 2001), but the evidence does not 
suggest that unions significantly reduced the rate of innovation (for example, Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van 
Reenen (1998)). 
21For a recent statement of government analysis and policy, see HM Treasury (2000); for a critical discussion, 
see Griffith and Simpson (1998). The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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FIGURE 3 


















































Source: Kneller and Young, 2001. 
 
Figure 3. Why was the UK productivity growth in the late 1990s disappointing? 
The slowdown was concentrated in manufacturing, where sterling’s strength hit 
hardest. There has also been an improvement in the employment rates for less-
skilled workers due to the sustained level of growth and welfare-to-work 
policies
22 — this will tend to reduce measured productivity. But the USA has 
also been successful at increasing the employment of the less-skilled through its 
own welfare-to-work policies, so the widening US–UK productivity gap cannot 
be explained by labour market policies. 
Is the relatively poor performance in the UK due to a lower investment in 
ICTs than in the USA? Unfortunately, it is very difficult to answer this question 
clearly due to the poor quality of statistics on the UK ICT base. There is no 
official series measuring gross fixed investment in computer or ICT equipment, 
nor is there a rigorous quality-adjusted price series. 
Recent attempts to estimate the level and growth of ICT capital in the UK 
have used the US hedonic price deflator and spliced together a UK series of 
computer investment from the input–output tables. Figure 4 illustrates one 
attempt comparing the USA with the UK and ‘Euroland’ (the countries using the 
Euro). The unadjusted series show that the UK had just over 1 per cent 
productivity growth in the late 1990s compared with nearly 1.5 per cent in   
 
                                                                                                                                    
22For evidence on the effectiveness of the New Deal in stimulating employment, see Bell, Blundell and Van 
Reenen (1999) and Van Reenen (2001). Fiscal Studies 
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FIGURE 4 
Business Labour Productivity in the UK and the USA 






























Source: Walton and Broadbent, 2000. 
 
Europe and nearly 3 per cent in the USA. Using the adjusted deflators, the UK 
improves but there remains a sizeable gap with the USA. 
Kneller and Young (2001) find that the growth in the UK computer stock 
since 1979 was broadly comparable to that in the USA. However, the share of 
the computer stock in GDP is much lower in the UK: Oulton (2001) estimates 
that the ICT stock was 3.7 per cent of GDP in the UK compared with 6.3 per 
cent of GDP in the USA. Thus the overall contribution of ICT to productivity 
growth was also much lower in the UK. 
The conclusion appears to be that the lower level of the ICT stock partially 
explains the slower productivity growth in the UK than in the USA in the late 
1990s and the MFP gap with the USA.
23 But the vast majority of the difference 
is due to a higher rate of technical change (MFP) in the USA than in the UK. 
3. A Digression: But What About the Internet? 
The potential productivity benefits of the Internet have been extensively 
discussed in the media and popular press. The productivity boom of the late 
1990s in the USA coincides with the spread of the Internet. By the end of 2000, 
about 50 per cent of Americans and a third of the British were hooked up to the 
World Wide Web. This is the fastest rate of diffusion of a new technology since 
television began in the 1940s and 1950s. Internet-based companies enjoyed   
 
                                                                                                                                    
23Crafts and O’Mahony (this issue) estimate that 5 percentage points of the 26 per cent UK–US labour 
productivity gap can be accounted for by lower ICT stocks. The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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FIGURE 5 


























Source: UN Human Development Report, 2000. 
 
extraordinarily high share values (until the corrections starting midway through 
2000). Finally, the USA leads the world in the density of Internet hosts (see 
Figure 5). Is the Internet the ‘smoking gun’?
24 
There are two channels that may cause the Internet to push down prices. First, 
there are large potential savings in distribution costs — less rent, fewer staff, less 
packaging, fewer middlemen, etc. Some estimates put the distribution cost as 30 
per cent of the final sales price of a car, for example. Second, downward 
pressure on prices may come from lower search costs as consumers can more 
easily compare prices from different web sites either via search engines or 
through online companies that generate price comparisons (i.e. ‘shopping bots’ 
such as MySimon). On the other hand, by using more information on consumers, 
retailers may be able to price-discriminate more effectively (think of airline 
ticketing) and this could actually lead to higher prices for some groups.  
There is a small but growing literature on the effects of the Internet on 
consumer prices. The evidence is mixed. Analysing online prices, Brynjolfsson 
and Smith (2000) find that books and CDs tend to be about 9–16 per cent 
cheaper online compared with conventional retailing, even after shipping and 
handling costs. But Bailey (1998) finds the opposite — in 1997, books, CDs and 
software were more expensive online. Lee (1997) also finds that cars are actually 
more expensive online than offline. 
                                                                                                                                    
24See the collection of essays in the Winter 2001 Journal of Economic Perspectives for a longer discussion of 
the economics of the Internet. Fiscal Studies 
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Turning to the effects from online to offline, Brown and Goolsbee (2001) 
find evidence of downward price pressure from Internet-based life insurers on 
life insurance premiums offered in conventional ways. They conclude this rather 
indirectly by finding that groups that are more likely to use the Internet are 
increasingly likely to be offered cheaper insurance rates.  
If the Internet is transforming the economy, then this should show up in the 
aggregate productivity figures. Since most Internet-related activity would fall 
outside durable manufacturing, it is open to the Gordon critique, discussed in 
Section III(2) above, that the productivity speed-up is overwhelmingly in the 
durable manufacturing sectors. He argues that the Internet stacks up badly 
relative to the great inventions of the late nineteenth century because: (a) it 
mainly involves new delivery systems (duplicating mail-order catalogues) rather 
than new products (the innovations of the early twentieth century were more 
radical — electric television, the telephone, cars and movies); (b) much of e-
commerce is in defence of market share; and (c) much Internet activity is 
actually workers enjoying more on-the-job consumption. 
Larger productivity effects may come from business-to-business e-commerce 
(B2B), such as Internet-based auctions of semiconductor chips and the 
auctioning of surplus capacity when transporting goods. These activities are 
predicted to grow rapidly over the next few years.
25 Brookes and Wahhaj (2000) 
simulate a macro model building in analysts’ forecasts of the reductions in the 
costs of intermediate goods. They claim that B2B should boost GDP growth by 
0.25 of a percentage point a year for 10 years in the major industrialised nations. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to know how realistic these analysts’ forecasts of cost 
savings are likely to be. There is an inbuilt tendency towards over-optimistic 
forecasts in many companies and this will be especially so in an area surrounded 
with so much uncertainty.
26 
I conclude that the Internet has had, so far, a limited impact on productivity 
growth. It certainly cannot explain the macro productivity findings.  
IV. THE UPWARDS MARCH OF INEQUALITY 
So far, we have concentrated on the impact of the new economy on the growth of 
economic wealth — but what about its distribution? One of the major topics of 
research in the last 10 years has centred around the remarkable increase in wage 
inequality in the USA and the UK and, to a lesser extent, in many other OECD 
                                                                                                                                    
25Wadhwani (2000) reports from a Bank of England survey showing that, while only 28 per cent of UK 
businesses currently use the Internet for purchases, 68 per cent expect to do so by the end of 2002. 
26Litan and Rivlin (2001) offer a similar simulation exercise based on a more rigorous sector-by-sector analysis 
of the impact of the Internet. They suggest that the Internet could add 1–2 per cent on US productivity over the 
next five years. The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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countries.




th percentiles of the UK hourly wage distribution for men. 
Inequality has grown rapidly since 1979. The shift in inequality in the 1980s 
occurred in both the UK and the USA, although, unlike in the USA, there have 
not been falls in real wages for the lowest decile in the UK.
28 Part of this general 
increase in inequality has been caused by the increase in the rate of return to 
skill. For example, the US wage premium for an individual gaining a college 
degree (relative to a high-school diploma) was 10 per cent for a 26- to 30-year-
old in 1976. By 1996, the same 26- to 30-year-old had a college wage premium 
of 35 per cent. In the UK, the rate of return to college rose from 17 per cent to 31 
per cent (see Card and Lemieux (2000)).  
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Source: Gosling, Machin and Meghir, 2000. 
                                                                                                                                    
27European countries have suffered from employment inequality — a large fall in the job prospects of less-
skilled individuals. 
28Another difference is that, although the wage gap between educated and less-educated workers fell in the 
1970s in the UK and in the USA, within-educational-group inequality was rising throughout the 1970s in the 
USA whereas it was not in the UK.  Fiscal Studies 
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There is a consensus that technical change has had some role to play in the 
decline in the demand for less-skilled workers. There is now a large body of 
evidence that recent technology has been skill-biased. Educated individuals find 
it easier to cope with the uncertainty surrounding the best use of new 
technologies, such as computers.
29 Machin and Van Reenen (1998), for example, 
show that, in seven OECD countries, the industries that have had the fastest 
shake-outs in less-skilled workers are the high-tech industries (measured either 
by R&D intensity or computer usage). These tend to be the same industries 
across different countries. 
The presence of skill-biased technical change by itself cannot explain the 
increase in the relative wage of more-skilled workers, as technical change has 
been occurring for many years. Either it accelerated (as may have happened in 
the late 1990s) or something else happened as well. Card and Lemieux (2000) 
emphasise a slowdown in the growth of the supply of education by cohort, 
Gosling and Machin (1995) emphasise labour market institutions (such as unions 
and the minimum wage) and Wood (1994), amongst others, emphasises trade. I 
am personally quite sceptical about the trade element
30 but suspect that the first 
elements do have a role to play, in addition to technology. The key issue, 
however, is that there is an underlying pressure to increase the demand for more-
skilled workers that is unlikely to recede. The quantity and quality of the supply 
of human capital are always playing catch-up with the demand side, and there 
will be a tendency towards inequality between skill groups in the new economy. 
The increase in cross-sectional inequality can be decomposed into two parts. 
There is a ‘permanent’ increase due to the higher rate of return to human capital. 
But there is also a ‘transitory’ element, related to the increase in volatility of 
income over the life cycle. Blundell and Preston (1998) emphasise the 
importance of this second element by examining differences in the time-series 
pattern of consumption and income by cohort and education group. This 
increased volatility of households’ incomes may be a reason for the insecurity 
people feel in the modern economy. There does not seem to be robust evidence 
of a decrease in job tenures or job turnovers, but survey evidence does point to a 
feeling of insecurity. Nickell, Jones and Quintini (2000) also show that there has 
been an increase in the number of wage falls, especially for those in middle 
income groups.  
Policy-makers have recently become concerned by the ‘digital divide’ — the 
fact that higher-income people are more likely to have access to computers than 
lower-income people.
31 The policy response has been to attempt to make it easier 
for lower-income people to have access to computers. This gets the causality 
                                                                                                                                    
29See Chennells and Van Reenen (2001) for a survey. 
30Desjonqueres, Machin and Van Reenen (1999) show that the industries experiencing the fastest shake-outs of 
unskilled workers across countries were not those with the greatest exposure to trade, from less-developed 
countries or otherwise. 
31For example, Department of Trade and Industry (2000). The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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entirely backwards. More recent technologies will always be purchased by 
wealthier people simply because they have more disposable income. 
Furthermore, giving a random individual a computer either at home or in the 
workplace will not automatically raise their wages. Highly skilled people get 
higher wages and are given access to new technologies because of their skills.
32 
The correct policy response is to give the poor more skills, not more computer 
hardware. 
The pressures towards greater inequality through skill-biased technical 
change and through increased volatility are real enough. The increased inequality 
of wages accounts for the increased amount of inequality since 1997 despite the 
redistributive effects of the current Chancellor’s Budgets (for example, working 
families’ tax credit). The policy challenge is how to reap the productivity gains 
from the new economy without leaving behind those who will lose out. 
V. A POLICY FRAMEWORK 
In this section, I discuss a simple general framework for thinking about the 
effects of different policies in the new economy, and, in the next section, I deal 
with some specific policy areas. Space limitations mean that I cannot deal with 
many other issues, such as the role of ICTs in improving the productivity of 
government or the impact of the Internet on general tax policy. 
The productivity growth tournament between countries is a strange race. Like 
the Mad Hatter’s tea party, ‘all will have prizes!’. In other words, every country 
can win from a structural speed-up of US productivity growth as the 
technological benefits spill over to other nations. The critical issue is how fast 
the technology can be transferred from the USA to other countries. 
The current policy framework correctly identifies productivity as a key area 
for concern (HM Treasury, 2000). Increases in investment are sought through 
greater macroeconomic stability and higher public investment. If successful, 
these raise inputs per person but are unlikely to raise MFP. 
In Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2000), we propose a framework for 
analysing technical change in OECD countries.
33 For a sector in a country, there 
is an equilibrium growth rate of MFP. In the long run, this will depend on the 
rate of growth of MFP in the frontier country (often, but not always, the USA). 
The level of MFP, however, will not necessarily be the same as that of the 
frontier country, even in the long run. Relative MFP levels will depend on 
exogenous factors outside a policy-maker’s influence (geography, culture) and 
                                                                                                                                    
32The positive correlation between wage and computer use highlighted by several authors (for example, 
Krueger (1994)) is primarily due to the fact that high-wage workers are selected to use new technologies (see 
Chennells and Van Reenen (1997 and 2001)). 
33It is based on an endogenous growth model in the spirit of Aghion and Howitt (1998). Fiscal Studies 
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endogenous factors that can be influenced by policy choices. We discuss some of 
these policy-sensitive factors below.  
Within the OECD over the long haul, there is a tendency for those further 
behind to catch up with the leaders. This is the familiar process of convergence: 
the further you are behind, the faster you catch up. But the hundred-billion-dollar 
question is: ‘what are the factors that enable countries to catch up more quickly 
than others?’. 
In fact, many of the variables that affect the long-run relative level of MFP 
will also affect the process of catch-up. Take R&D, for example. Many writers 
have long claimed that it has ‘two faces’.
34 The familiar face is the way in which 
R&D can stimulate innovation and push the technological frontier outwards. The 
less-studied face is the role R&D plays in helping firms learn where the current 
technological frontier actually is. A firm will need to have well-trained scientists 
to read and understand leading-edge scientific papers and patents in order to 
improve productivity. As a researcher, I am often painfully aware of how much 
of my own research time is spent just understanding what other people have 
already accomplished, rather than pushing forwards the boundaries of knowledge 
myself. Since most empirical studies of the rate of return to R&D have focused 
on the USA, this literature has underestimated the impact of R&D. The impact of 
R&D on productivity is greater for countries further from the frontier, which can 
use their R&D commitments both to innovate and to catch up. 
Another factor that may generate innovation and learning is investment in 
human capital
35 — this has been the focus of endogenous growth theory. 
Empirical investigations have convincingly demonstrated the importance of the 
level of human capital in increasing the level of productivity, although the impact 
of the level of education on growth and convergence is more controversial.
36 
Trade is the third most commonly examined factor. Lower barriers to trade 
through tariff and quota reductions could stimulate productivity growth in a 
number of ways. First, it may be that capital imports from high-tech countries 
embody the latest scientific knowledge. Second, openness may increase product 
market competition and therefore stimulate more innovation (see Section VI(3)). 
Of course, there are also other ways to increase product market competition 
through better regulation, tougher competition policy and removal of government 
subsidies for failing firms. 
Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2000) produce strong evidence that 
human capital (as proxied by the proportion of workers in the country with 
college education) and R&D stimulate both innovation and learning. The effects 
of trade are positive, but weaker than those of R&D and skills.
37 In thinking 
                                                                                                                                    
34For example, Cohen and Levinthal (1989). 
35For example, Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). 
36See Sianesi and Van Reenen (2001) for a survey. 
37Foreign direct investment is also thought to be a key instrument in spreading new technologies (either 
through competition or more directly, by examples of best practice). Yet the data on this are worse than those The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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through policies to stimulate MFP growth, these are the factors we need to focus 
on. 
VI. SPECIFIC POLICIES 
1. Innovation Policy: Tax Credits for R&D  
R&D is only one part of the innovative process, but it is a very important part. 
Section II described how the effects of knowledge spilled over to other firms. 
This will generally imply an underinvestment in R&D and therefore a need for 
more public support. The UK performance in R&D has deteriorated since the 
early 1980s. This is due partly to the decline in government funding, but the 
picture is similar even if one looks at the industry-funded business-performed 
part of R&D (see Van Reenen (1997)). 
Neither is the relative decline simply due to deindustrialisation — such as a 
decline of particular high-tech industries (for example, the UK computer 
industry). The stagnation of R&D intensity is a general pattern within industries. 
Part of the reason could be linked to the failure to introduce a more favourable 
fiscal regime for R&D as many other countries have introduced more generous 
tax provisions. Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2001) show that R&D tax 
credits are quite effective at raising R&D over the long run.
38 Griffith, Redding 
and Van Reenen (this issue) also examine evidence on the desirability of R&D 
tax credits — by how much are MFP and growth raised by a more generous tax 
treatment of R&D? They show that it can be quite a cost-effective way of raising 
productivity growth. 
Nevertheless, many questions remain over implementation. In particular, 
given the inelastic supply of R&D workers, the first-order effect may be to drive 
up the salaries of highly skilled R&D workers (Goolsbee, 1998). In the longer 
run, this should have the desired effect of attracting more people into the R&D 
sector, but, in the short run, it will tend to increase (modestly) the degree of 
inequality. A better approach may be to alleviate the supply problem directly by 
expanding the supply of highly skilled workers.  
2. Human Capital Policy: Invest in Basic Skills 
The UK educational system does very well for the top end of the ability 
distribution but very poorly for the bottom. Elite science is traditionally strong 
(see Figure 7). The UK punches above its weight in terms of papers and 
citations, being quite close to the USA on a per capita basis. 
                                                                                                                                    
on the other factors, and — so far, at least — the empirical evidence is unconvincing. See Griffith and Simpson 
(2001) for the latest evidence. 
38See the survey in Hall and Van Reenen (1999). Fiscal Studies 
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FIGURE 7 



























Source: UK Office of Science and Technology. 
FIGURE 8 
































Source: UN Human Development Report, 2000. 
 
On the other hand, the UK is appalling on most measures of basic skills, as 
the Moser Report (1998), amongst others, has pointed out. The UK has a similar 
level of functional illiteracy to European countries that have only recently 
become wealthy (Ireland, Portugal and Greece) — see Figure 8. Although the 
USA also performs poorly, this is mainly to do with the high level of 
immigration into the USA from non-English-speaking countries (for example, 
Mexico). 
There are several advantages of an aggressive policy on human capital 
accumulation. First, more skills will increase labour productivity just like any 
other capital investment. Second, more-skilled workers are complements with 
new technologies (as discussed in Section IV), so it should be easier to The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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implement ICTs. Third, the evidence in Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen 
(2000) suggests that there should be an impact on technology transfer and 
innovation. Some of this may come from the adoption of innovative 
organisational changes (see Caroli and Van Reenen (2001)). Finally, there is the 
important ‘double whammy’ of improving equity as well as efficiency. If the 
emphasis is on basic skills, then this will tend to lower the degree of inequality 
as skill acquisition is focused on those most in danger of slipping behind. There 
could be both increased productivity and an expanded circle of winners. 
The government has made a start on expanding basic skills through pre-
school initiatives (Surestart), primary school (literacy and numeracy hours), a 
more rigorous inspection regime (OFSTED) and financial incentives to stay on 
in education between the ages of 16 and 18 (educational maintenance 
allowances). There has been less emphasis on secondary schools. All of these 
policies, however — no matter how successful they turn out to be — will only 
affect the flow of people entering the labour market. The critical issue is how to 
deal with the stock of people with poor basic skills (the 20 per cent functionally 
illiterate of Figure 8). The only really feasible way to reach these groups is likely 
to be through the benefit system, as low-skilled people come into frequent 
contact with the Welfare State. The New Deal policy, for example, offers a way 
of identifying those in need of basic skills training, and there needs to be a more 
systematic and concerted effort to raise their skills. This will have to combine a 
mix of incentives and careful mentoring. A tough policy may have to include 
benefit sanctions for those who refuse to participate on learning courses. 
At the top end of the educational ladder are the universities. The large and 
growing private return to a university education (see Section IV) suggests that 
taxpayers’ money should not be focused on higher general subsidies to students. 
The direction of movement should be increasingly towards a loans-based system 
whereby government helps to relax the financial constraints that some low-
income families may face. Universities do have a dual function, however, in 
supplying education and stimulating basic research. They are often at the centre 
of high-tech clusters, such as around the University of Cambridge. This implies 
that an increased rate of subsidy to research work in universities is a better-
targeted way of using resources than general subsidies to universities. This basic 
R&D is likely to create bigger spillovers than the R&D tax credit schemes going 
to private industry discussed above. 
3. Competition Policy: Strengthened, Not Weakened 
One view of the competition rules is that they should wither away in the new 
economy. Critics argue that they are unnecessary (the market will correct itself) 
and impossible to fulfil (the change is too rapid for a competition authority to 
make timely decisions). On the ‘competition policy is unnecessary’ argument, 
some of the outlandish claims that the Internet would remove all frictions and Fiscal Studies 
330 
usher in an era of perfect competition have been discarded in Section III. But the 
Schumpeterian argument that competition to win a race for a new technology 
abolishes the need for regulation is also flawed. It is true that there is likely to be 
an increase in the number of firms enjoying high market shares in the new 
economy. One reason is that the increased importance of R&D means more 
intellectual property protection and associated monopoly power as a reward for 
innovation. Another reason is the importance of network externalities. These are 
associated with the fact that the more people using a product (for example, a 
telephone network, a computer operating system or an Internet site), the more 
valuable it becomes. Converging on a standard has huge benefits and, once 
established, the company that produces the standard is in a powerful position to 
dominate the market (for example, Microsoft). Both of these factors give new 
economy industries a ‘winner-takes-all’ flavour. 
Market dominance is not welfare-destroying per se, but dominant firms have 
the ability and generally the incentive to behave in anticompetitive ways. For 
example, incumbent monopolists may have strong abilities to stifle the 
innovation of rivals. A dominant platform in one technology may enable a 
powerful firm to leverage into other industries and prevent competition. The 
Microsoft case hinges on exactly this point.
39 In the browser wars example, the 
US government showed that Microsoft deliberately attempted to kill the 
competitive threat from a new entrant (Netscape) through discriminating against 
hardware producers who dealt with Netscape and by bundling its own Web 
browser (Internet Explorer) free with the ubiquitous Windows operating 
system.
40 
Abuses of monopoly power can and do take place in the new economy. 
Recent microeconometric work reinforces the message that, although theorists 
may argue over details, empirical evidence demonstrates that product market 
competition generally spurs innovation.
41 Rather than diminishing, competition 
policy will become more important.  
The problem, however, is that the capacity of the antitrust authorities to deal 
with competition issues may be limited. This is partly due to complexity. The 
technological issues are genuinely harder than in old economy industries and 
they change rapidly due to innovation. The experts who can be drawn upon are 
not disinterested parties, and the government’s financial resources mean that its 
own in-house expertise will not be great. Furthermore, these high-tech markets 
are often global, which requires cross-border cooperation with antitrust 
authorities in many countries. 
                                                                                                                                    
39Fisher, 2000. 
40The recent decision in the Court of Appeal of US vs. Microsoft vacated the remedy imposed by the District 
Court on Microsoft but upheld the finding of fact that Microsoft had indeed abused its position as a monopolist 
of PC operating systems to drive out competitors in other markets. 
41For example, Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999). The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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The current government has put effort into strengthening the competition 
regime. The 1998 Competition Act and the proposed Enterprise Bill are steps in 
the right direction. Reductions in the degree of protectionism and integration of 
markets at the European level are also vital. Yet this seems an area where the 
ability of governments to act effectively is diminishing just as the importance of 
their actions is increasing (Posner, 2000). 
4. Industrial Policy: The Example of Pharmaceuticals 
Industrial policy in the new economy is about the management of change, not the 
attempt to pick winners. Many high-tech industries interact with the public 
sector in a myriad of ways — for example, through regulation of 
communications firms, through public purchasing, through partnerships in 
service delivery and through a thousand more subtle and unintended ways. 
Modern industrial policy attempts to ensure that the public sector takes a joined-
up approach to these regulations and does not stifle innovation. The approach 
needs to be specific to each sector.
42 Particular care should be taken over those 
industries where the UK appears to have some type of comparative advantage. 
The bio-pharmaceutical industry is an interesting example of a successful 
high-tech industry. About a quarter of all UK R&D is in this sector. This is a 
greater concentration than in any other major country and is suggestive of some 
sort of comparative advantage in research in this sector. Two of the world’s 
leading firms — Glaxo-Smithkline and Astra-Zeneca — are based in the UK. 
The fast-growing biotech industry is stronger in the UK than in any other 
European country (although Germany has recently had a strong performance). 
The reasons for this success are complex. A key influence is the link to a 
strong academic science base. Analyses of the specialisation profiles based on 
citations reveal a UK comparative advantage in biology and clinical medicine.
43 
Second, the industry has long been open to extensive foreign direct investment 
and competition. Third, there is an absence of negatives affecting other 
manufacturing industries (for example, the car industry’s poor labour relations 
and the attempts to create ill-fated ‘national champions’ in the 1970s). Most 
interesting, however, is the role of smart government regulation. The UK drug 
licensing authority was one of the first (1967) to require an efficacy as well as a 
safety test. This ruled out the strategy of producing low-quality ‘me too’ drugs 
that the Italian and Japanese industries have followed. Furthermore, the system 
of price and profits regulation
44 has been voluntary and stable and has allowed a 
reasonable rate of return on R&D. Obviously, this was more important in the 
                                                                                                                                    
42Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2000) find, as one would expect, that the drivers of productivity (frontier, 
R&D and human capital) have different effects in different industries. 
43Nickell and Van Reenen, 2001, Table 3.8. 
44The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) is analysed in detail in Bloom and Van Reenen (1998). Fiscal Studies 
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days when a significant proportion of sales were made in the UK, but it gave UK 
industry a critical advantage at a crucial stage of industry evolution. 
The lesson from the industry is not that all regulation is harmful for 
innovation.
45 Some regulation is undoubtedly necessary in an industry 
characterised by extremes of asymmetric information and by public procurement 
(through the NHS). Rather, the lesson is that regulation has to evolve in an 
intelligent way to fit the facts of a particular industry. The UK industry faces a 
number of regulatory challenges. For example, the allowable rate of return for 
drugs sold to the NHS is undermined by parallel imports from other European 
countries (such as Greece and Portugal) that regulate for extremely low prices. 
Reimbursement policies in the NHS actually encourage this. Some solution to 
this problem is necessary at the European Union level in order to protect the 
returns to pharmaceutical R&D. In 1999, the UK government set up a cross-
government task force to work with the industry to find ways to improve the 
policy framework to foster the competitiveness of the industry,
46 and this may be 
a good model in the future for creatively seeking solutions to industry-specific 
problems. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
I have argued that it is premature to be reading the last rites over the body of the 
new economy. The acceleration in US productivity growth in the last five years 
of the twentieth century is well documented and the strongest evidence of 
something ‘new’ in the economic world. 
An economist by the name of Karl Marx was a dedicated student of the 
physiology of the new economy of his day. Unlike the famous passage in the 
Communist Manifesto, however, ‘all that is solid’ does not ‘melt into air’. The 
rules and tools of the old economy can be used to map out some of the contours 
of the new.  
I have argued that there is much that is not so new about the new economy. 
At least three things were emphasised. First, key new economy features are a 
deepening of pre-existing trends — the importance of information and 
communication technologies, of human capital, of innovation and of 
globalisation. Second, one tool designed to track the old economy — that of 
growth accounting — was fruitfully used in Section III to show how about four-
fifths of the recent acceleration in US productivity growth was linked to 
increased accumulation of ICTs (two-fifths) and faster technical change in the 
computer sector (two-fifths). Third, an analysis of the growth in multifactor 
productivity since the mid-1970s offered a framework for thinking through the 
                                                                                                                                    
45McKinsey Global Institute (1998) comes dangerously close to asserting this in places. 
46The Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Taskforce (www.doh.gov.uk/pictf/index.html). The New Economy: Reality and Policy 
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policy framework to boost UK productivity. There is no need to discard 
Samuelson just yet, let alone Smith, Schumpeter or Ricardo. 
Some specific policies were sketched. I believe that boosting R&D and 
human capital will have major effects on the wealth of the UK, both in terms of 
expanding the technological frontier and in terms of helping us catch up with the 
current leaders. Competition and industrial policies are also important. Whatever 
policies are chosen, however, the primary problem is how to take advantage of 
the prospect of productivity increases without stimulating further increases in 
inequality. There is still a centrifugal force pushing up the fortunes of the skilled. 
The gravest danger to the new economy is that the less-able and unlucky feel 
they have nothing to gain from the ‘knowledge society’. Their rejection of it will 
both be a moral disaster and lead to an erosion of the potential benefits of new 
technology. 
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